Interview with Dr. Zeno Leoni

Dr. Zeno Leoni is an assistant professor in International Security at the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London. His research focuses on US and Chinese grand strategies, US-China, UK-China relations and Five Eye Alliance. He is the author of articles such as “The End of the “Golden Era”? The Conundrum of Britain’s China Policy Amidst Sino-American Relations” and the chapter on the United Kingdom in The Palgrave Geopolitical Atlas

Paweł Mazurek: What are the UK’s main strategic priorities in the post-Brexit era?

Dr. Zeno Leoni: The UK needs to consolidate its alliances and partnerships. After Brexit, Britain found itself in a delicate geopolitical position. Having lost its main economic partner, the European Union, it was unable to secure trade agreements with China – due to political sensitivities – or with the United States, given growing protectionism in Washington. Meanwhile, the “Global Britain” strategy delivered limited tangible gains. However, the situation has begun to evolve. The Labour government is now exploring closer economic relations with both the EU and China, while the previous government succeeded in concluding a trade agreement with the United States.

PM: What was the so-called “golden era” in UK–China relations?

ZL: The “golden era” represented a moment of liberal optimism under the Conservative government led by Prime Minister David Cameron and Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne. During this period, British elites saw an opportunity to open the UK economy to China and gain greater access to the Chinese market. However, the initiative was characterised largely by rhetoric. Beyond a limited number of high-profile deals – most notably the inclusion of the renminbi among the currencies cleared in London – the economic relationship primarily benefited individual firms rather than developing into a structural partnership. Nonetheless, the “golden era” paved the way for further economic cooperation with China, which continued even after its formal end. This shift came with the UK’s decision to reject Huawei’s 5G technology, marking a clear political turning point in bilateral relations.

PM: How has Brexit changed UK–China relations?

ZL: The impact has been limited, insofar as this did not affect the trading arrangements between China and the UK, and because the UK – despite leaving the European common market – lacked the political appetite to pursue a more comprehensive trade agreement with Beijing. At the same time, from a commercial perspective, the UK has become less important for China

PM: How is the “special relationship” between the U.S. and the UK perceived in China?

ZL: Chinese policymakers recognise that the UK–US “special relationship,” despite periodic tensions, is a long-term alliance that China cannot realistically undermine. As a result, Beijing does not seek to draw the UK fully to its side. However, it is reasonable to argue that China aims to influence the UK selectively on specific issues when it suits Beijing’s interests, at times also using the UK to signal or demonstrate China’s broader global influence.

PM: How has Trump’s second term influenced relations between London and Beijing?

ZL: It cannot yet be argued that this has had a tangible impact. Prime Minister Starmer’s visit to China should not be interpreted as a Carney-style act of defiance toward the US hegemon. Rather, the trip to Beijing and Shanghai was long overdue and reflects the practical necessity for the UK to engage with the world’s second-largest economy. It also follows a broader trend over the past year in which the UK and China have gradually reopened channels of cooperation. This does not preclude the possibility that a future UK government might adopt elements of multialignment, but this visit was neither an expression of such a strategy nor an attempt to signal distance from Washington.

PM: How is the issue of the new Chinese embassy in London perceived in London and Beijing?

ZL: For London, two key considerations were at stake. First, the UK needed to refurbish its embassy in Beijing, so denying China a new embassy in London would not support that objective. Second, the UK aims to maintain a constructive relationship with China where possible. Since security assessments indicated manageable risks, the Prime Minister approved the project, though such a decision would likely not apply to critical infrastructure. For China, the new embassy allows staffing in a capital that remains vital for business, finance regulatory institutions, politics, and the network of think tanks and academia, while signaling to the wider world that Beijing is influential in the West.

PM: Are there any economic or political interest groups in either country that are willing to change the current trajectory of bilateral relations?

ZL: In the UK, economic interest groups, particularly in finance, technology, and higher education, favor maintaining constructive engagement with China to protect trade, investment, and research collaborations. The China-Britain Business Council (CBBC), the 48 Club, HSBC, Standard Charter, and others are especially influencia,  in this regard. Politically, however, the government balances these interests against security concerns and alliance obligations, especially with the US, even if there is a cross-party consensus in parliament about the need to engage China on transnational issues such as Artificial Intelligence and climate change. In China, the leadership views the UK as a secondary partner, with limited incentive to fundamentally shift bilateral relations, though certain business and trade actors advocate for deeper cooperation to access European markets. Overall, while both countries contain actors seeking closer ties, these groups lack the influence to dramatically alter the cautious, managed trajectory of UK–China relations.

Paweł Mazurek PhD candidate in Political Science and Administration at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Visiting Research Student at the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London. His research interests include U.S. – China relations, the U.S. Congress, and theories of international relations.