Global Gateway 101: A Short Guide to the EU’s Development Initiatives and their Challenges in Asia

INTRODUCTION

The 2010s and 2020s have been marked by intense geopolitical competition, not only in traditional military and economic terms but also in the realm of global development initiatives. Major global actors, such as China, the US, and Japan, have each presented and pursued infrastructure and economic investments aiming at expanding their economic and other interests.

The most prominent of all the global development initiatives is undoubtedly China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Launched in 2013, it almost immediately started channeling massive investments into roads, ports, railways, other physical infrastructure, and digital connectivity projects all across the globe. Three years later, the government of Japan responded to the BRI by partnering with the World Bank and establishing the Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) Partnership aimed at providing grant support for infrastructure projects in developing countries, especially across Asia. The US did not remain idle either and, along with Japan and Australia, launched the Blue Dot Network aimed at providing “an internationally recognized certification for quality infrastructure projects” as well as the Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative along other G7 countries, whose goal was to bolster global economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic era.

In view of these developments, the EU wished not to be left behind others, and on December 1, 2021, introduced its own development initiative, the Global Gateway. Although at first glance, it could seem like Africa, one of the EU’s traditional partner in the post-colonial era, is the primary focus of the initiative, the Global Gateway certainly does not forget about the strategic importance and increased geopolitical role of Asia.

UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL GATEWAY

From day one, the Global Gateway has been presented as the EU’s flagship initiative for global infrastructure investments, international cooperation, and economic connectivity. The first promises made by the EU within the framework of this initiative were quite optimistic. It promised to mobilize up to €300 billion in investments between 2021 and 2027. Further, unlike other programmes and initiatives that faced criticism for their lack of transparency or debt-creation (e.g., China’s BRI), the Global Gateway promised to differentiate itself by promoting sustainability, transparency, and mutually beneficial partnerships.

The Global Gateway is based on six principles: democratic values and high standards, good governance and transparency, equal partnerships, need for green and clean investments, focus on security, and catalyzing the private sector. Further, it aims at supporting the EU’s partners and closing the global investment gap in the areas of digital security, climate and energy, transport, health, and education and research. The examples of projects under the Global Gateway set for 2025, in the case of Asia, include investments in renewable energy infrastructure, digital transformation, and connectivity in Vietnam, Bangladesh, and the Philippines as well as programmes and commitments such as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor in Central Asia.

All of the above principles and aims are to be pursued under the Team Europe approach, which means “joining forces so that the EU’s joint external actions becomes more than the sum of its parts.” However, this approach as well as the EU’s complex structures and its rigid code of conduct regarding the financing of the Global Gateway create obstacles for this initiative. Probably the biggest wave of criticism regarding this EU project has been related to the Gateway being “merely recycled old money already committed elsewhere by the EU and its member states,” which was said to further emphasize the EU’s “lack of fresh funds.”

This sheer perception has the capability of rendering the EU’s flagship initiative irrelevant in the eyes of its partners as there exists a presumption that the money spent in particular areas of development within the Global Gateway, would be spent in the exact same domains anyway, even if this initiative was not in place. The natural question following this presumption seems to be: is the Global Gateway needed at all?

It goes without saying that the EU has been trying its utmost to convince its partners that the answer to this question is affirmative. However, taking this into account, if we were now to compare the Gateway to the Chinese BRI, which has been presented and believed to be an entirely novel (yet tradition-preserving) concept, providing fresh and unconditional money to China’s partners, we can notice how competitive of an environment the EU has entered and currently operates in.

ASIA: A STRATEGIC BATTLEGROUND

Numerous experts are in agreement that in the 19^th century, the world was Europeanized, in the 20^th, it was Americanized, and the 21^st century is going to be the Asian Century. This claim finds vast evidence in reality. For the last decades, this continent has been the home of the fastest-growing economies and both current (China) and potentially incoming (India) manufacturing powerhouses, the so-called World’s Factories. Recently, apart from being a global economic superstar, Asia and especially the Indo-Pacific have become a stage for a major geopolitical rivalry, this time between China and the United States.

Nonetheless, this region’s immense potential to further develop remains hindered by its poor infrastructure. In fact, the most recent data from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) show that “developing Asia will need to invest $13.8 trillion, or $1.7 trillion annually, in infrastructure from 2023 to 2030 to sustain economic growth, reduce poverty, and respond to climate change.”

Of course, it is predominantly initiatives such as Japan’s Quality Infrastructure Investment (QII) Partnership, China’s BRI, or ASEAN Infrastructure Fund that aim at providing the much-needed funding for Asia’s infrastructure. However, the EU, seeing the potential of the region and witnessing its growing importance, has also been whetting its appetite for a slice of the Asian cake.

THE GLOBAL GATEWAY IN ASIA

Unfortunately, the analysis of practical actions taken under the Global Gateway in Asia shows that the EU’s appetite for that region is much larger than its capabilities and determination to actually satisfy it.

The official factsheet on the Global Gateway investments in Asia and Indo-Pacific presents the reader with forty-two cases of EU projects and activities undertaken in these regions. At first glance, this number seems rather high. However, this perception slowly fades after delving deeper into the document. It is because many of the listed projects are not referring to any precise activity or project that the EU would be involved in. Thus, we are reading about the unspecified “support of the development, production and use of sustainable aviation fuels” or “boosting digital connectivity in the Pacific” and finally the “implementation of Team Europe Initiative on Green recovery in Nepal.”

Among the projects proposing concrete steps and measures, the absolute majority is devoted to the areas of climate and energy, transport, and digital development. Only two projects address the issues of health and four touch upon the domain of education and research, which creates a general perception of imparity of the focus devoted by the EU to these particular areas of the Gateway in Asia. It also creates an impression that the EU is mostly focused on investments that would provide it with concrete benefits and not on the ones that would enhance the areas of health or education and research of the local communities.

Lastly, instead of focusing on concrete ideas and measures to create a positive image of a pro-active entity in the eyes of its partners, the EU seems to prefer boasting about the numbers and figures allocated to its investments in Asia. However, as discussed above, not much comes out of these numbers or perhaps should I say, not much coming out of them is made visible to a broader public. Therein lies one of the main issues with the Global Gateway: its communication.

THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

Before delving into the problem of communication surrounding the Global Gateway, a few acknowledgements are due.

First and foremost, it goes without a doubt that the EU is an immensely complex machine comprising 27 member states with separate capabilities and interests. Therefore, as stated before, the issues such as financing of the Global Gateway or shifting its priorities take place rather slowly and constitute arduous negotiation and institutional processes. However, even more importantly, since the introduction of this initiative in 2021, the world has changed. Most significantly for the EU, Russia’s full-scale aggression on Ukraine brought back the notion of territorial war to Europe and irrevocably changed the post-WWII geopolitical landscape of this region.

Russia is now perceived as a threat to the physical security of the EU, which is something that virtually all member states (with the exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) recognize and are actively trying to address. In other words, the priorities shifted. The EU and its members are now focused not on spreading their influence in Asia by means of infrastructure investments but rather on increasing their military and defense spending. Not to mention the, perhaps less visible, but ongoing and costly efforts of decarbonization, which also remains one of the EU’s top priorities.

Whereas these factors could explain the EU’s current lack of strong initiatives under the Global Gateway in Asia, they certainly could not explain the EU’s negligent approach to the narratives and communication surrounding its flagship initiative. The narrative premises of the Global Gateway, which should help the EU “sell” it, hide its flaws, and promote it as truly groundbreaking, are simply too generic and shallow.

For example, the EU’s constant use of clichéd phrases such as “smart investments, quality infrastructure, highest social and environmental standards” as well as focusing mainly on the figures that are to be spent and invested under the Global Gateway instead of talking about the palpable projects that are to be carried out, connected with the lack of concrete actions, and even lack of concrete plans of actions, create an image of a “classic” European initiative: slow, immensely bureaucratic, overly regulated, and conditional. In two words, ineffective and unattractive.

What also stands out in the EU’s communication surrounding the Global Gateway is the fact that it does not seem to be trustworthy in terms of paying attention to its Asian partners’ perspectives, perceptions, and the actual needs of their local populations. The EU merely attempts at creating an illusion of doing so by stating that projects under the Global Gateway would be “based on the needs of our partners,” but such a statement is certainly too little to convince any of the Asian countries, still remembering the colonial era and the European rule and exploitation of their lands. It could seem then that the EU’s concern about its Asian partners’ needs could only be true if the details of those needs were to be determined by the EU itself, which would assume that it simply knows best what is good for its partners without necessarily consulting them.

To prove this, one could reach out all the way to Africa, where such perceptions of the EU also have a long-lasting and well-reasoned tradition. Therein, the EU could be seen as covertly forcing its interests under the guise of development, for example while pushing for regional integration in Africa. The EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements were considered unfavorable not just to job creation, but also to regional and continental integration. This perception has created negative reputational effects, particularly in Africa, which could extend further to areas where the EU would have the potential to be considered a beneficial actor, such as Asia.

CONCLUSIONS

In spite of its immense communication flaws, the Global Gateway in Asia is a bold and much-needed initiative that does have the potential to strengthen the EU’s influence on this continent, while promoting sustainable, transparent, and mutually beneficial infrastructure investments and networks.

So far, it represents the EU’s most significant attempt to offer an alternative to other initiatives, mostly China’s BRI, by promising to provide high-standard, climate-friendly, and economically viable projects. Unlike the BRI, which has been criticized for its lack of transparency, debt-creation, and preference for bilateral agreements, the Global Gateway prioritizes good governance, financial sustainability, and rules-based investments. In theory, this should have the potential to attract Asian countries looking for long-lasting international partnerships and long-term solutions of their infrastructure problems, rather than short-term politically driven actions. However, in this case, the sheer potential is not enough.

It is clear that vis-à-vis the Russo-Ukrainian war and climate change, the EU’s current priorities are security, defense, and decarbonization. It goes also without a doubt that due to its legal, political, and bureaucratic structures, the EU is not able to freely and flexibly introduce shifts into its initiatives taken under the Global Gateway, increase their budgets, or relocate their funding, which constitute means available to other state-actors, the likes of China. Nonetheless, what the EU does have full control over and is able to flexibly introduce changes to are the Global Gateway’s narratives and communication.

This initiative needs a strong narrative, one that could truly resonate with the EU’s Asian partners’ interests and perceptions. It must become a compelling and adaptable story that would move far beyond the typical EU’s rhetoric and better “sell” the initiative by emphasizing mutual benefits, local ownership, and economic opportunities. Instead of providing Asia with its rigid messaging, the EU should pursue a dynamic and engaging approach making it a trustworthy and responsive partner in terms of development initiatives and global investments. Only then will the Global Gateway truly shine and become an attractive alternative for the EU’s Asian partners.

Konrad Szatters graduated in English and Chinese Philology and European Interdisciplinary Studies from the University of Silesia and the College of Europe in Natolin. His research focuses on strategic narratives in Chinese foreign policy, EU-China relations, and development initiatives. Currently, he is an Associate Researcher within the Jean Monnet Network project on EU heritage diplomacy in Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Polish Embassy in Beijing, China, and the College of Europe in Natolin as an Academic Assistant. His work has been published in Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, New Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia Studies Journal, and Central European Institute of Asian Studies.