Smiles, Handshakes, and Suspicion: What the US-China Summit Really Tells Us

By Nihar Kulkarni & Dr. Uday Patil

The US and China held a bilateral summit on the 13th and 14th of May 2026 in Beijing. The visit was attended by the presidents of both countries, accompanied by the top business leaders, particularly from the American side. By all outward appearances, it was considered a significant diplomatic moment in the history of US-China relations. Readouts from both governments suggest that they have multiple economic agreements and discussed strategic issues of mutual interest. However, something else happened at this summit that deserves far more attention than the agreements themselves.

As the US delegation departed China, footage circulated in the media showing American officials throwing away all the gifts, electronic devices, and souvenirs they had received from the PRC. The reason, according to media reports, is straightforward: due to the high risk of surveillance and digital espionage through electronic devices, the US delegation had decided not to carry a single item or use their own personal devices during the entire visit.

This scenario tells something else about the visit: on one hand, two heads of state shaking hands, business leaders smiling for cameras, and agreements being signed. And on the other hand, behind all of it, a delegation is so distrustful of its host that it discarded every gift upon leaving.

This detail deserves more analytical attention than any agreement signed in the room. It is not a footnote. It is the story. The media, strategic policy circles, and academic commentators have been flooded with speculation since the talks. Some argued that a G-2 is likely to emerge, a new concert of great powers between Washington and Beijing. Others warn of Cold War 2.0. At this moment, it is genuinely difficult to explain or predict the most likely scenario. But one thing is clear: both parties fundamentally lack confidence in one another. The distrust is deep, structural, and mutual. The image of discarded gifts is not a minor detail; it is a window into the actual state of the relationship.

This is why it is unlikely to see the formation of a G-2 so easily. There will be some economic cooperation between these two great powers because trade is too intertwined, supply chains too enmeshed, and mutual dependence too entrenched for a clean rupture. Hence, both will have to cooperate, but this cooperation will exist alongside innumerable geopolitical and strategic frictions. The summit is evidence of both simultaneously.

What we are witnessing, then, is not Cold War 2.0 in a simple sense. It is the return of Cold War logic, but with different characteristics. The original Cold War had its own architecture: ideological blocs, proxy conflicts, and arms races with clear adversaries. This one is different. Two economies are deeply integrated. Two powers that need each other even as they fundamentally distrust each other. The Cold War is at our doorstep, but it will not look like the previous one.

Though multiple media reports and strategic commentaries suggest that the summit was unsuccessful and could not achieve desired outcomes such as accommodating each other’s strategic interests; however, nearly one month after that, on 16th June 2026, the US government made a decision to restore the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) designation, reverting to the pre-2018 designation. This reverse approach by the US could be seen as a milestone in accommodating China’s strategic interests in the region, as we are aware that China has long opposed the notion of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘QUAD’. Whether this signals genuine accommodation or tactical repositioning, the structural distrust revealed at the airport shows that the answer is more likely the latter.

This phase will be full of recalibration of foreign policy and national security priorities by great powers, and broader changes in global politics. For the world at large, the priority must be improving economic, strategic, and institutional resilience at the domestic level. States cannot afford to be structurally dependent on either pole in a world where great powers are simultaneously competing and cooperating with each other.

For small states, three principles matter above all. First, respect geography, whether you are closer to the US, China, or any other great power; be pragmatic with your neighbours and respect the realities of your geographic position. Second, cultivate regional multilaterals and people-to-people contact, academic exchanges, cultural ties, and joint development projects, because trust built on the ground will prove more durable than any formal agreement on paper. And third, build resilience at home: structural development, stronger institutions, and more capable national systems, so that in times of crisis, countries can absorb the shock.

The US-China summit of May 2026 will be studied for years. Yet the most revealing part of the meeting was not what was signed in the conference room. It was what was thrown away at the airport. That simple act captured the reality of the relationship more clearly than any joint statement. Behind the smiles and handshakes, distrust remains the defining feature of US-China relations, and that leaves little room for optimism about the future.

Nihar Kulkarni is a PhD researcher in International Relations at the University of Warsaw. He writes on the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, great power politics, and India’s foreign and national security policy.

Uday Patil completed his Ph.D. at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal, where he was a Dr. T. M. A. Pai Doctoral Fellow. His doctoral research focused on post-Cold War American policy-making towards China. His research interests include U.S. grand strategy, U.S.–China relations, and great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Patil has published in Strategic Analysis (MP-IDSA), STSF, East Asia Forum, and The Hindu.

Nihar Kulkarni is a PhD scholar of international relations at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. His PhD thesis examines “the evolution of India’s strategic partnership with Japan in the Indo-Pacific region since 2007." His research areas include India’s foreign policy and national security, geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, great power politics, strategic partnerships, and alliance frameworks. His work primarily examines evolving strategic and geopolitical dynamics in Asia and the broader international system.