The 16th India-Japan Summit: What It Means for the Indo-Pacific and the Quad

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi visited New Delhi from 1-3 July 2026 for the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit; this visit followed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tokyo for the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit in August 2025. The primary focus of Prime Minister Takaichi’s visit was to advance bilateral economic cooperation and finalize several key trade and investment agreements. The summit further reaffirmed the three priority pillars of the India-Japan partnership: (a) defense and security cooperation; (b) economic partnership, including economic security, energy resilience, technology, and innovation; and (c) people-to-people exchanges.

During the summit, India and Japan signed several agreements aimed at enhancing bilateral economic cooperation and the overall Special Strategic and Global Partnership. In the past year alone, more than 120 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed between the two countries. At this summit, Japan has also announced plans to invest ₹1 trillion (equivalent to $10.5 billion USD, calculated at ₹95.2 per dollar during early August 2026) across multiple sectors, including business, connectivity, infrastructure development, science and technology cooperation, artificial intelligence, and innovation. Furthermore, both countries reiterated and agreed on developing joint projects and initiatives in defense, energy, science and technology, and infrastructure sectors, including progress on the UNICORN defense project, JIMEX naval exercises, maritime domain awareness, and connectivity projects in Northeast India, among others.

However, beyond the bilateral agreements, this summit raises a more important question considering changing global geopolitical dynamics, including US-China relations and strategic rivalry, regional security challenges of the Indo-Pacific, among others, because nearly one month after the May 2026 US-China bilateral summit in Beijing, Washington quietly reinstated the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) designation, reverting to the pre-2018 name. This was a significant signal. The Indo-Pacific framing and geopolitical notion have long been opposed by Beijing, which views it as a strategic construct designed to encircle China. The US decision to step back from that label has put the notion of the Indo-Pacific on the defensive, raising uncomfortable questions about Washington’s long-term commitment to the framework. Moreover, how the US’s allies, especially Japan, would react to Washington’s stance on the Indo-Pacific and the future of the Quad is another important question.

The question is particularly urgent right now. It is worth recalling that India and Japan were the original architects of the Indo-Pacific concept, especially when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a historical “Confluence of two seas” speech in the Indian Parliament in 2007, arguing that the security challenges of one region (either the Pacific or the Indian Ocean region) affect the other part of the region due to the interconnectedness of maritime trade routes. The concept of the Indo-Pacific was born out of the India-Japan strategic convergence, and it is no coincidence that its future now depends significantly on how these two countries choose to sustain, adapt, and champion it.

In this regard, in the 16th India-Japan annual summit, there was comparatively less focus on the Indo-Pacific narrative by both governments and especially in the media, as opposed to the overwhelming emphasis and focus on the Indo-Pacific narrative in the last 10 years.

Is Quad still relevant?

Hence, the question of whether the Quad will become fully functional in the future, and what the future of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad partnership will look like, has become more pressing. Regarding this, India and Japan discussed broader global issues and the changing geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region, especially concerns related to supply chain resilience; maritime security challenges in the South China and East China Seas; energy security; connectivity in Northeast India and its linkages with the wider Indo-Pacific region; and both leaders have reiterated the importance of strengthening the Quad framework in these areas of key strategic priority. Another question at this point is whether the Quad is relevant or actively functioning. The answer to this question would be both ‘yes‘ and ‘no.’

Yes, because all four Quad countries, including the US, Australia, Japan, and India, continue to view the Quad as an important platform for addressing common security challenges and advancing shared strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.

No, because despite regular leaders’ meetings, ministerial dialogues, maritime exercises, and some progress in supply chain resilience and other initiatives, the Quad has not yet delivered any major institutional or strategic outcomes. Therefore, it would be fair to argue that the Quad is still evolving and has not yet become a fully functional strategic framework.

One of the most important players in the Quad is the US, and the US reinstatement of the Pacific Command nomenclature seems like a policy reversal. Whether this policy reversal should be interpreted as a genuine accommodation of China’s interests or merely a tactical strategic repositioning by the United States in the Pacific remains to be seen in the coming years.

One can argue that the US decision to reinstate the name Pacific Command might be a signal of accommodating China’s interests in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly because China has been opposed to the concept of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad framework. On the other hand, one can also argue that the reinstatement of the Pacific Command name reflects the US’s core strategic focus on the Pacific region and its attempt to avoid strategic distractions by expanding its focus to other areas, including the Indian Ocean Region. When the US renamed Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, analysts such as Van Jackson argued the shift was a folly that would invite disaster. This could be based on the assumption that US-China rivalry will intensify in the future, leading to greater strategic competition and tensions; therefore, the US may be seeking to avoid unnecessary strategic distractions.

India, Japan, and the Indo-Pacific vision

However, since India and Japan are the original architects of the Indo-Pacific concept, they have a responsibility to keep this vision alive, regardless of whether their allies continue to support it. If the US, in the process of accommodating Chinese strategic interests, chooses to deviate from the Indo-Pacific narrative, India and Japan must remain committed to their shared goal. Their partnership was the foundation of this idea, and they must continue to pursue it to ensure their common vision for the region is not lost to the shifting priorities of others.

Furthermore, it is important to look at how strategic ideas evolve. Between 2000 and 2013, India and Japan often centered their cooperation around the idea of an ‘Asian Century,’ but that narrative was largely replaced by the broader Indo-Pacific framework after 2017-2018. Having made this shift, both nations must now avoid strategic impatience. For the Indo-Pacific vision to succeed, New Delhi and Tokyo must commit to it for at least the next few decades, ensuring the concept takes deep root rather than being abandoned for the next new trend.

Nevertheless, returning to the Quad, its relevance can still be maintained if there is sufficient political will among its members. Even if, hypothetically, the United States attempts to accommodate China, there remains significant strategic distrust between Washington and Beijing. Consequently, power dynamics and the security dilemma in the Indo-Pacific are likely to continue evolving.

Therefore, the Quad framework is likely to evolve over time rather than disappear. The common and overlapping interests of the Quad countries, including maritime and transnational security, economic security and prosperity, critical minerals, critical and emerging technologies, resilient supply chains, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response, will continue to provide a strong foundation for cooperation. This India-Japan Annual Summit also highlights the continuing importance of the Quad. Both countries reiterated their commitment to strengthening cooperation within the Quad framework and reaffirmed their support for holding the next Quad Leaders’ Summit.

In my view, as long as regional security challenges posed by both state and non-state actors continue to exist, and as long as the Quad countries continue to share overlapping strategic interests, cooperation within this framework will continue. Whether that cooperation is high or low intensity will depend on prevailing geopolitical circumstances, strategic priorities, and political necessity. At times, we may witness deeper and more active cooperation, while at other times, cooperation may appear limited. However, the Quad is unlikely to disappear because the member countries will continue to face common strategic challenges and security threats, including conventional and non-conventional maritime security challenges, maintaining supply chain resilience, and the hegemonic rise of China, among others, in the Indo-Pacific region.

Nihar Kulkarni is a PhD scholar of international relations at the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. His PhD thesis examines “the evolution of India’s strategic partnership with Japan in the Indo-Pacific region since 2007." His research areas include India’s foreign policy and national security, geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, great power politics, strategic partnerships, and alliance frameworks. His work primarily examines evolving strategic and geopolitical dynamics in Asia and the broader international system.