How China uses its narratives on the Russo-Ukrainian war to court the Global South

Three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it is entirely clear that this conflict has irrevocably changed the geopolitical landscape both in Europe and beyond and its repercussions will be felt far beyond the battlefield for years to come. This war also demonstrates that beyond traditional realms such as economy or military power, the domain of strategic narratives can be crucial in shaping global perceptions and policymaking, thus having the capability to influence the realities of conflicts on the ground.

Whereas all the major involved state actors are observing the war in Ukraine and actively using strategic narratives to frame it in alignment with their interests, China seems to be playing a different game. Unlike the US, EU, Ukraine, or Russia, Beijing’s strategic narratives on the war are not designed only to reach out to any of the warring states or their immediate allies. Instead, China’s focus reaches farther, all the way to the Global South.

China’s narratives promote it as a neutral (albeit slightly Russia-leaning) actor interested in nothing else but peace, sovereignty, multilateral cooperation, and maintenance of the provisions of international law. This vision is meant to promote China as the opposite of the “collective West” with the US at its forefront, which, in China’s eyes, is characterized by hubris, constant political overreach, and most importantly a colonial mindset.

China’s emphasis on Western interventionist pursuits and imperialist past aims at enhancing relations and creating the idea of a shared community with its partners in the Global South, who experienced Western colonialism firsthand. China believes they are the ones that could be persuaded to join its anti-Western front and ultimately help to build a new global order or at least reshape the already existing one, which has evolved into one of China’s priority objectives ever since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012.

PIVOT TO THE GLOBAL SOUTH

The primary foundations of China’s diplomatic efforts regarding the war were laid out already on February 26, 2022, when it presented the “five-point position on the Ukraine issue” (乌克兰问题的五点立场 – Wūkèlán wèntí de wǔ diǎn lìchǎng). It presents China’s commitment to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, calls for dialogue and diplomacy in conflict resolution, and stresses the need for a long-term maintenance of a balanced European security architecture.

However, as the war was unfolding throughout the next months and years, China’s diplomatic efforts started becoming more and more oriented towards the Global South countries. A major development in that regard was the “six-point consensus” (六点共识 – liù diǎn gòngshí), jointly issued by China and Brazil on May 23, 2024, touching upon the “political settlement of the Ukraine crisis.” Apart from involving Brazil, a BRICS member and one of China’s most important partners in the Global South, the consensus’ last point seems to be an implicit message to other countries of that group. It opposes “the division of the world and creation of closed political or economic groups” and calls for international cooperation and inclusivity vis-à-vis energy, trade, food security, and infrastructure investments. In China’s eyes, these are the main issues that its Global South partners are struggling with and thus, by opposing and willing to tackle them, China hopes to garner their sympathy and support.

FIRST PILLAR: CHINA VS. THE WEST

However, taking this into account, a question arises: who, in China’s eyes, are the powers responsible for dividing the world and creating enclosed circles of influence accessible only to the chosen ones? The answer is simple: it is the West with the United States as its leader. This grievance constitutes an important first pillar of China’s courting to the Global South for two reasons. First and most important, it is a useful tool through which China is able to distinguish itself, a “peaceful, non-colonial, and respectful” superpower, from the “others” (the US and the West), who, as China says, can take at least part of the blame for the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war due to the five consecutive rounds of NATO expansion in the past, which threatened Russia’s security. Second, once this vision is presented, this narrative can be utilized to create a sense of a shared community with the Global South by means of building on their past experiences and anti-colonial views.

In this regard, China’s message seems clear: the US and the West have not changed their mindset and approach. If we take a closer look at the war, they pursue only their own interests there and are treating Ukraine and Russia only through the prism of their own needs. It is because they perceive smaller and less wealthy states, such as the ones from the Global South, as merely pawns on the grand chessboard of global affairs, which is a mechanism well-known from the colonial era. This is why the Global South countries need a strong ally, an advocate superpower that understands and respects them and would represent their interests on the global stage. This advocate happens to be the People’s Republic of China.

SECOND PILLAR: PEACE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The second foundation of China’s strategic narratives on the war in Ukraine designed to appeal to the Global South is its repeated emphasis on the importance of establishing peace through dialogue, respecting sovereignty, and maintaining the provisions of international law.

China believes these particular messages have the potential of reverberating among its Global South partners due to the fact that, apart from an advocate, these countries are in need of a trustworthy, predictable, and engaged partner. Taking into account Trump administration’s quasi-isolationist policies in the US and the EU’s predominant focus on Ukraine and internal issues, China’s positioning may indeed appear quite compelling to its Global South partners, if only due to the lack of an alternative. The great number of Global South states participating in the Chinese-led Global Development Initiative, aimed at “building a community with a shared future for mankind in the field of development,” seems to be a proof that the Chinese rhetoric resonates well with its addressees.

THIRD PILLAR: MUTUAL BENEFITS AND MULTILATERAL WORLD ORDER

Whereas the US and EU are busy with pursuing their own interests and are not willing to share their economic or technological resources with other countries, China presents itself as an alternative, prioritizing mutual benefits and cooperation reaching far beyond its own immediate interests. Beijing’s narratives portray it as a superpower that does not seek influence or domination, but instead pursues policies that are best for all the nations, thus creating a “community of common destiny.”

This concept manifests itself in China being a vocal proponent of involving the countries of the Global South in the process of the resolution of the Russo-Ukrainian war. As these countries too, deserve to have their voices heard globally, China is willing to help and allow that to happen. On top of that, Beijing’s calls for the adherence to the UN Charter and maintenance of multilateral world order in resolving the conflict constitute further attempts to structurally enhance the Global South countries’ status in the international arena.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS

Visibly, the scope of China’s narratives on the Russo-Ukrainian war reaches far beyond this sheer conflict and includes the promotion of Beijing’s more general ideas regarding the reshaping of the international world order and the enhanced role the Global South would play in it. As the scope of China’s narratives is global, their implications could have an equally large outreach.

Beijing’s seemingly righteous narrative of becoming the voice of the Global South countries and making their opinions heard across the globe could be perceived as one of the crucial elements of China’s grand strategy, aiming at undermining the Western dominance. In fact, this strategy may lead to the deepening of the already existent division into the so-called Global North and Global South. In turn, this division may transform into a situation bearing striking similarities to the Cold War period, this time, however, divided into the North and South, rather than the East and West.

Of course, as the current economic and political situation is entirely different and much more complex than in the past, the division between globally competing blocs would be no longer rooted in an ideological battle between capitalism and communism. Instead, it would be a New Cold War of narratives and perceptions regarding the contrasting visions of global governance, economic development, and international order.

CONCLUSIONS

China’s strategic narratives on the Russo-Ukrainian war represent a meticulously crafted effort to strengthen its influence among the Global South countries, thus challenging the Western global hegemony. By leveraging the narratives of peace, sovereignty, mutual benefits, and multilateral world order, China juxtaposes itself against the West led by the US and promotes itself as an alternative superpower fully committed to establishing a fair and inclusive global order.

So far, this strategy has been quite successful. Nonetheless, while promoting its narratives, China seems to be forgetting that the Global South is an immensely complex and differentiated group of countries with their own histories, views, and interests. It is true that in its practical actions, for example the development initiatives, China takes that complexity into account and pursues country-specific bilateral dialogues and agreements. However, in the case of its narratives, China seems to be treating the Global South as a nearly monolithic group. In a medium-term perspective, this misconception may lead to disagreements and misunderstandings, thus heavily backfiring on China’s plan to create an anti-Western front and undermining its efforts vis-à-vis the Global South.

China’s ultimate success will also depend on whether it will be able to maintain the delicate balance: presenting itself as a neutral and inclusive superpower while ensuring that its practical actions align with its rhetoric and narratives. Maintaining this balance is precisely one of the most important challenges faced by China and other global state and non-state actors nowadays. It is no longer enough to win a battle or undertake successful practical steps on the ground. One must also make sure that they are coherently narrated and perceived as victorious or righteous in the public sphere. Strategic narratives are as crucial as military victories, and in an era dominated by digital communication, some of the most decisive battles are no longer fought with weapons, but with words and images on social media.

Konrad Szatters graduated in English and Chinese Philology and European Interdisciplinary Studies from the University of Silesia and the College of Europe in Natolin. His research focuses on strategic narratives in Chinese foreign policy, EU-China relations, and development initiatives. Currently, he is an Associate Researcher within the Jean Monnet Network project on EU heritage diplomacy in Ukraine. Previously, he worked at the Polish Embassy in Beijing, China, and the College of Europe in Natolin as an Academic Assistant. His work has been published in Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, New Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia Studies Journal, and Central European Institute of Asian Studies.